We extend the revealed preference theory of consumer's behavior originating in Samuelson's Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference to simultaneously permit both non-singleton choice sets and random choice. We provide a consistency postulate for demand behavior when such behavior is represented in terms of a stochastic demand correspondence. When the consumer spends his or her entire wealth, our rationality postulate is equivalent to a condition we term "stochastic substitutability." This equivalence generates as special cases in most of the basic results regarding consumers' demand behavior in the existing revealed preference literature.
Introduction
Most fundamental findings in the classical revealed preference theory of consumers' demand concern the inter-relationship between Samuelson's Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (WARP) and various testable restrictions on the demand behavior of a competitive consumer. We extend these findings beyond the single-element choice sets considered in the classical theory; simultaneously, we also relax the deterministic framework of the theory to permit random choice.
WARP, introduced by Samuelson (1938a) , implies that the demand function must be homogeneous of degree zero in prices and wealth. It also implies the following, which we call Samuelson's Inequality (SI) . Suppose the consumption bundle chosen by a competitive consumer in some initial pricewealth situation costs exactly her wealth in some altered price-wealth situation. Then, SI tells us that the products of the price change and the quantity change for each commodity must sum to a non-positive number; the number must be negative if the bundles chosen are different. SI implies non-positivity of the ownprice substitution effect. This property, in turn, yields the familiar 'demand theorem' -other things remaining the same, a fall in the price of a normal good does not decrease the quantity of it purchased by the consumer. For a consumer who spends her entire wealth, SI turns out to be equivalent to WARP (we call this equivalence Samuelson's Substitution Theorem) . These results are basic to the classical choice-based theory of consumer's behavior and capture most of its testable content.
The standard revealed preference theory of demand behavior is subject to two major constraints. First, while deriving the familiar comparative static properties of a competitive consumer's behavior from WARP, either it is assumed that, for every admissible price-wealth situation, the consumer chooses a single consumption bundle, or, when this assumption is not made at the outset, WARP is introduced in a form that ensures that, faced with a given price-wealth situation, the consumer will always choose a single consumption bundle. Thus, while MasColell et al. (1995, p.23) start their discussion of the revealed preference theory of consumers' behavior with a demand correspondence, when discussing comparative statics and WARP (Mas-Colell et al. (1995, pp. 28-34) ), they switch to the assumption of a demand function. On the other hand, though Samuelson (1938b) does not assume that, for every admissible price-wealth situation, the consumer chooses exactly one consumption bundle, WARP, as formulated by him, ensures exactly that. There does not seem to be any persuasive reason why one should rule out the possibility that there are several consumption bundles in the consumer's budget set that she considers equally worthy of being consumed. One possible justification for ruling out multiple choices corresponding to a given price-wealth situation may be the (implicit) intuitive assumption that the consumer's choices are generated by strictly convex preferences, but strict convexity of preferences itself lacks clear intuitive justification. Can the consumer's observed behavior reveal a multiple-element choice set? The answer to this question depends on the nature of such observation. The literature often focuses on observed market data. Of course, if we confine ourselves to information about consumption bundles purchased by the consumer in the market place in different price-wealth situations, then we would not observe a multipleelement choice set. One can, however, think of other types of observations, such as survey experiments, where consumers are asked to choose a (possibly multielement) subset out of some feasible set of alternatives (cf. Arrow (1959) ). The theory developed in this paper (Sections 2-5) applies directly to such observations of multiple-element choice sets. Additionally, as we demonstrate in Section 6, our theory, which permits multiple-element choice sets, can also explain a wider range of empirical observations (as compared to the theory that a priori rules out multiple-element choice sets) even when one's observations are confined to observations of the consumer's market purchases.
Second, the standard revealed preference framework rules out the possibility of any probabilistic element in the consumer's choice. Yet, empirical evidence does often suggest the existence of a random aspect to individual decision-making; and a very large literature, with contributions by both economists and psychologists, argues the case for incorporating probabilistic choice within formal theoretical models. Intuitively, observed randomness of choice may come about either because preferences are inherently unstable, or because the external observer fails to notice changes in the environment that impact on the agent's decision-making. Modeling consumer's behavior in a stochastic framework would evidently allow one to accommodate these neglected 2 See, among others, Luce (1959 Luce ( , 1977 , Becker (1962) , Halldin (1974) , Falmagne (1978) , Barbera and Pattanaik (1986) , Clark (1995) , Dekel et al. (2001 ), McFadden (2005 , Alcantud (2006) , Gul and Pesendorfer (2006 ), McCausland (2009 ) and Nandeibaum (2009 . Econometricians routinely attempt to weigh probabilistic evidence against the predictions of a deterministic theory, devising statistical notions of 'goodness of fit' to accommodate the theory. This literature, in contrast, seeks to develop a theory that is itself probabilistic, so that it can be directly confronted with probabilistic evidence.
aspects. Moreover, in certain situations the demand behavior of a group of (real) consumers can be conveniently modeled as stochastic choices made by a single (fictitious) consumer (see, for example, Bandyopadhyay et al. (2002) ). In such situations, there is no intuitive or empirical reason why, for every ('real') consumer in the underlying group of consumers one should a priori rule out the possibility of a multiple-element choice set for every price-wealth situation. Thus, there seems to be a case for going beyond the traditional framework by modeling the consumer's choices in terms of stochastic demand correspondences (SDCs).
Some recent contributions (Bandyopadhyay et al. (1999 (Bandyopadhyay et al. ( , 2004 ) extend the standard results regarding the properties of a deterministic demand function to the case of stochastic choice, but they concentrate exclusively on (stochastic) singleelement choice sets. Neither the deterministic choice-based theory of consumer's behavior nor its more recent stochastic counterpart has much to say about what happens to the familiar Samuelson-type properties of demand behavior when the choice set is allowed to have many elements. Though several contributions in the deterministic choice-based theory do permit choice correspondences 3 , they focus on rationalizability, in terms of a preference ordering, of the agent's choice behavior and do not address the issue of extending Samuelson's classical results on the demand behavior of a competitive consumer to encompass demand correspondences. 4 Yet this is not a trivial issue, even when the competitive consumer's choice behavior satisfies a rationality condition as strong as rationalizability in terms of an ordering.
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Indeed, it is not even clear from the existing literature on deterministic choices how one should interpret either the non-positivity of the own price substitution effect or the demand theorem when the consumer's choice sets may contain multiple consumption bundles. The interpretation of these notions in that context involves comparisons of the consumption of a commodity across two possibly non-singleton sets of consumption bundles. Should one then interpret these properties in terms of average consumption, minimal consumption, maximal consumption, or set 3 See, for example, Arrow (1959) , Richter (1966) , Afriat (1967) , Sen (1971), and Varian (1982) . While Arrow (1959) and Sen (1971) consider the choice behaviour of a general agent, who need not be a competitive consumer, Richter (1966) , Afriat (1967) and Varian (1982) specifically consider the case of a competitive consumer. 4 This is true even of Richter (1966) , Afriat (1967) and Varian (1982) , who are concerned specifically with the behavior of competitive consumers. Chiappori and Rochet (1987) push this literature back to its restrictive classical context by identifying conditions for a finite set of consumption data, satisfaction of which implies rationalizability in terms of a strictly concave and infinitely differentiable utility function (and, therefore, an infinitely differentiable demand function). 5 As is well-known, rationalizability of (deterministic) choices in terms of an ordering is a stronger requirement than Samuelson's Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference, which is equivalent to the deterministic counterpart of the property of Weak Axiom of Stochastic Revealed Preference that we explore in this paper.
dominance? The existing literature on deterministic multi-valued choice (see, for example, the references cited in footnote 4 above) is silent on these key issues. The same is also true for the existing literature on stochastic choice.
Since multiple-element choice sets and stochastic choice both appear independently plausible on a priori intuitive grounds, an attempt to develop a unified framework that simultaneously permits both these features, by means of SDCs, may be motivated purely on such grounds. Furthermore, as we later show (Section 6), a theory formulated in terms of SDCs can accommodate a wider range of observed demand behavior than one formulated in terms of a deterministic demand function, or a deterministic demand correspondence, or a stochastic demand function (SDF).
We develop such a unified theory. We introduce a rationality, or consistency, postulate for demand behavior when such behavior is represented via an SDC; we call this rationality postulate the Weak Axiom of Stochastic revealed Preference (WASRP). When the consumer necessarily spends her entire wealth, WASRP turns out to be equivalent to a condition we term stochastic substitutability. This condition expands SI to a context that permits probabilistic as well as multi-valued demand behavior. ) unless it is identical to x . Stochastic substitutability expands this restriction to our context of probabilistic and multi-valued demand behavior in the following way. Let A be any given collection of consumption bundles which cost exactly the consumer's wealth under both price-wealth situations. Consider the probability of choosing a set of
all of whose members: (i) lie outside A, and (ii) cost at least W under the price vector p. Intuitively, stochastic substitutability requires this probability to be no less than that of choosing a set of bundles under   W p, such that: (i) all its members lie outside A, and (ii) at least one of its members is
The equivalence between our consistency postulate and stochastic substitutability generates, as special cases, various earlier versions of Samuelson's Substitution Theorem proved in less general frameworks. The relevant versions of the non-positivity property of the own substitution effect, the demand theorem, and homogeneity of degree zero in prices and wealth for demand representations, all emerge as corollaries in every case.
Section 2 presents the basic notation. Section 3 develops the idea of representing demand behavior of a single consumer via SDCs and also the idea of using an SDC as an aggregate representation of the demand behavior of a group of homogeneous consumers choosing deterministically, possibly on the basis of weakly convex preferences that generate non-singleton choice sets. Section 4 defines some possible properties of SDCs and introduces our rationality postulate for SDCs. In Section 5, we present our main results. In Section 6, we identify the exact sense in which observed market behavior can be viewed as compatible with choice on the basis of an SDC. An SDC is so compatible when the observed probability of purchasing any consumption bundle, say x, is no more than the probability of choosing a collection of bundles containing x, ascribed by that SDC. We show how our rationality postulate, while necessarily encompassing other versions of the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference as alternative special cases, can additionally accommodate forms of demand behavior that violate such versions. Specifically, we show that, given that the consumer always spends her entire wealth, every SDF consistent with observed choice can violate WASRP, yet such observed choice may nevertheless be compatible with an SDC that satisfies WASRP. In the case of deterministic choice, one may observe the consumer as always choosing x from the budget set B and x' from the budget set B',
. While such choice necessarily violates Samuelson's WARP, it may nevertheless be rationalizable in terms of a weakly convex preference ordering. The thrust of the Afriat-Varian tradition of demand analysis lies in finding conditions under which such consistency may be ensured, and is motivated by the extra empirical coverage it offers to standard theory. Our analysis in section 6 parallels this tradition and extends it to probabilistic choice in the weaker context of WARP (and thus, by implication, of underlying preference relations that are weakly convex and complete but not-necessarily transitive). In this section, we also outline how our rationality postulate can be tested on market data. Section 7 concludes. Proofs are presented in the Appendix. 
Some notation

Stochastic demand correspondence
Our first step is to formalize the idea of modeling a consumer's demand behavior via an SDC, and to locate this idea in relation to other, more traditional, representations.
Definition 3.1. Let Z be any given non-empty subset of Z . A stochastic demand correspondence (SDC) with domain Z is a functional rule C which, for
, specifies exactly one finitely additive probability measure Q on   is the probability that the (possibly multi-element) set of chosen bundles will belong to A. Note that we require Q to be only finitely additive.
, etc. will be denoted, respectively, by Q Q  , etc. Thus, an SDC captures the idea that, given a budget set in its domain, (i) the consumer may choose a subset with multiple elements, and (ii) she may choose stochastically among the alternative subsets available.
An SDC is said to have a complete domain iff its domain is Z itself and it is said to have an incomplete domain otherwise. Though the assumption that the consumer's SDC has a complete domain is more in conformity with the traditional theory of consumer's behavior, we develop our analysis with reference to an SDC the domain of which is not necessarily complete. This more general formulation allows us to use our concept in discussing the consumer's observed behavior, which can be summarized only in terms of an SDC with an incomplete domain, given that observations can cover only a finite number of price-wealth situations (see Section 6 below). 
, and for every
. An SDC is singular when the probability of choosing a set with multiple bundles is zero. It is degenerate when choice is deterministic. We shall identify a singular SDC with a stochastic demand function (SDF), a degenerate SDC with a deterministic demand correspondence (DDC), and a singular and degenerate SDC with a deterministic demand function (DDF).
An SDC may be used as an analytical construct to aggregate deterministic demand behavior by n consumers, represented by n DDCs. Consider a population of individuals all endowed with the same wealth, W, and facing the same price vector, p, who exhibit consumption behavior represented by (possibly different) DDCs. We permit individual preferences to be weakly convex, so that individual choice sets may be non-singleton, Then group consumption can be modeled via a representative consumer facing the price wealth situation (p, W) and choosing according to an SDC. This SDC must be such that, for any collection, A, of subsets of the budget set, the probability of choosing a member of A is simply the proportion of the population who do so. 
Some properties of SDCs
We now introduce a series of properties that an SDC, C , with domain
, may have. The first, 'tightness', requires the consumer to reject all bundles that do not exhaust her wealth.
Definition 4.1.
Our next property, familiar from the traditional theory, is that, for all price-wealth situations, demand behavior should not change when all prices and wealth change in the same proportion. In our expanded context, this property translates into the requirement that the probability of choosing from any given collection of subsets of the budget set should not change, so long as all prices and wealth change by the same proportion.
Definition 4.2. C satisfies homogeneity of degree zero in prices and
Next, we reinterpret the standard notion of non-positivity of the own-price substitution effect. In the traditional DDF-based framework, this property requires that, if the price of only one commodity, say i, falls, all other prices remaining constant, and the consumer's wealth is compensated so that she can exactly afford the old consumption bundle, then the amount of the i-th commodity demanded should not fall. In articulating this idea for an SDC, one faces two intuitive problems. The consumer may now choose multiple bundles and the choice set is stochastic in nature. Which consumption bundle should be our reference bundle for determining the level of compensation? Second, what is the exact sense in which we can talk about the quantity purchased of a commodity being higher in one situation as compared to another?
Our answer to the first problem is to consider every bundle that could possibly have been chosen initially as a reference bundle for determining the level of compensation (provided the new price vector and the adjusted wealth, together, belong to the domain of the SDC). Our answer to the second is to interpret the idea of demand for the i-th commodity 'not falling' in a probabilistic setdominance sense, in relation to the amount contained in this initial reference bundle. Suppose, starting from some initial price-wealth situation   . Suppose now the probability that, in the new situation, every consumption bundle in the consumer's choice set contains more than  (resp. no less than  ) of commodity i is greater than or equal to the probability that, in the initial situation, some consumption bundle in the choice set contains more than  (resp. no less than  ) of commodity i . We shall then say that demand for commodity i has 'not fallen' under a wealth compensated change in its price. 
Next, we expand the notion of a normal good from its classical context. We also introduce the property of regularity of a commodity, which constitutes the stochastic counterpart of the notion of a non-upward sloping demand curve for a commodity. 
Recall now the inequality due to Samuelson (1948) , which we call SI.
, and a different bundle '
. We proceed to extend SI to contexts where C is not constrained to be singular and degenerate.
Definition 4.5. Let C be tight. Then C satisfies stochastic substitutability (SS) iff, for all ( , ) , ( ', ') p W p W Z  , and for all
and, for all }) . ,
Lastly, we introduce our rationality, or consistency, postulate. Definition 4.6. C satisfies the weak axiom of stochastic revealed preference (WASRP) iff, for all ( , ) , ( ', ') p W p W Z  , and for all
WASRP extends the intuition underlying Richter's (1966) Weak Congruence Axiom and Sen's (1971) Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference, both of which were formulated for DDCs, to our stochastic context. In the context of consumer's choice, Sen's (1971) Weak Axiom requires that if, in a given pricewealth situation ) , ( W p , all consumption bundles in a subset A of B are rejected, then, in any other price-wealth situation, no bundle in A can be chosen when some of the bundles chosen from B are available. The LHS of (4.4) is the probability (say  ) that, given Bandyopadhyay et al. (1999) .
Results
We now present our main results. Unless specified otherwise, it is to be understood that the SDC, C, has a domain Z , which is permitted but not constrained to be complete.
Proposition 5.1. (General Substitution Theorem) Suppose C is tight. Then C satisfies WASRP if and only if it also satisfies SS.
Proof: See the Appendix. The General Substitution Theorem (Proposition 5.1) is our central result. Under the assumption of tightness, it completely specifies the restrictions on demand behavior imposed by WASRP when applied to SDCs. For SDCs, Proposition 5.1 yields non-positivity of the own substitution effect, the demand theorem, and homogeneity of degree zero in prices and wealth.
Corollary 5.2. Suppose C is tight and satisfies WASRP. Then:
if C has a complete domain, then every normal good must also be regular, and (iii) C satisfies O H . Proof: See the Appendix. Counterparts of these results for DDCs can be derived from our General Substitution Theorem, when the SDC is constrained to be degenerate. The central result of Bandyopadhyay et al. (2004) , their Stochastic Substitution Theorem for SDFs, follows as a special case from Proposition 5.1, when SDCs are restricted to be singular. Bandyopadhyay et al. (2004) show that this result generates: (a) nonpositivity of the own substitution effect and the demand theorem for SDFs, (b) Samuelson's Substitution Theorem and (c) non-positivity of the own substitution effect and the demand theorem for DDFs. Hence, these results all follow from our General Substitution Theorem.
SDCs and observed market behavior
We now clarify how the assumption of a tight SDC satisfying WASRP can accommodate a wider range of observed demand behavior than the corresponding assumptions in the existing literature. 
, and
We can observe an individual's market behavior only for price-wealth situations in some finite non-empty subset, , Z of the infinite class Z . For each
, we can have only a finite number of observations of market choices. Further, even when the consumer has a non-singular SDC, we shall observe her buying exactly one consumption bundle at a specific point in time. We may, however, observe her buying different bundles in the same price-wealth situation at different points in time. Alternatively, with multiple individuals facing identical price-wealth situations, we shall observe possibly different bundles being purchased at the same point in time. In either case, given a price-wealth situation, we may observe a non-trivial frequency distribution for consumption bundles. Thus, the data relating to actual market purchases (whether individual or aggregate) allows us to construct only a discrete SDF, say c, with an incomplete domain Z . For all
denote the observed relative frequency that the purchased bundle lies in A . Suppose the 'true' SDC has a domain Z .
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What is the link between the true SDC, C, and observed choice behavior summarized by the discrete SDF, c? Definition 6.2. Let C be a given SDC with domain Z ; and let c be a given discrete SDF with domain Z . For all ( , )  p W Z , we say that c is compatible with C with respect to ( , ) p W iff, for every
We say that c is compatible with C iff c is compatible with C with respect to every ( , )  p W Z .
Recall that, except for Corollary 5.2(ii), none of our formal results needs any specific assumption, such as completeness, regarding the domain of the consumer's true SDC.
Example 6.3 shows that the framework of a tight SDC satisfying WASRP can accommodate a wider range of possible observations than the alternatives. Nevertheless, observed purchases can falsify the claim that they are generated by such an SDC. Suppose the observed tight SDF, c, is compatible with a tight SDC, C, satisfying WASRP. Since C satisfies WASRP, it must satisfy SS (Proposition
5.1). Consider the ordered pair
}. Noting C satisfies tightness, compatibility of c with C therefore implies:
Market data can, in principle, violate (6.2) and/or (6.3). If such violation occurs, one must conclude that the consumer's observed demand behavior is incompatible with any tight SDC satisfying WASRP that includes all the observed price-wealth situations in its domain.
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To see this more explicitly, first note that, if c violates (6.2), then:
. Let C be any tight SDC that is compatible with c. In light of (6.1), we then have:
(6.5)
Now, by (6.1), we also have:
which yields: Together, (6.4)-(6.6) imply a violation of (4.4), and hence, of WASRP, by the tight SDC C. It can be shown in an analogous fashion that violation of (6.3) by consumer's observed demand behavior is incompatible with any tight SDC satisfying WASRP that includes all the observed price-wealth situations in its domain.
In light of (6.2) and (6.3), the following can also be seen to hold. Observation 6.4. Suppose the observed tight SDF, c, is compatible with some tight SDC satisfying WASRP. Then, for every M i  , and for all
Observation 6.4 specifies the probabilistic version of NPS that can be tested against market data. An SDC satisfying WASRP provides the most general a priori analogue, of the WARP-based deterministic theory, that can be deployed to deduce this testable conclusion.
Concluding remarks
This paper has integrated and expanded the WARP-based theory of consumer's behavior to cover simultaneously both probabilistic choice and choice of multiple consumption bundles. Using a stochastic counterpart of Richter's (1966) Weak Congruence Axiom, we have developed our central result, the General Substitution Theorem, which implies as special cases most earlier results on properties of a competitive consumer's demand behavior. As we have argued, not only is this expansion of considerable intuitive interest, it can also accommodate a wider range of observed individual and group demand behavior than the more restrictive traditional approaches, while remaining open to falsification on the basis of observed experimental or market data.
Addressing the issue of rationalizability of WASRP-satisfying demand behavior in terms of complete, weakly convex but not necessarily transitive stochastic preference relations (in effect, a probabilistic and multi-valued random shocks, and issues regarding the relationship between our rationality postulate and weaker notions in general choice contexts, along the lines of Dasgupta and Pattanaik (2007) , can also be explored. Analogous extensions to the deterministic choice-based theory of competitive but not-necessarily profit maximizing firm behavior (Dasgupta (2005 (Dasgupta ( , 2009 ) also suggest themselves. Furthermore, we have been unable to identify restrictions on an SDF, satisfaction of which would prove both necessary and sufficient for the SDF to be compatible with some tight SDC satisfying WASRP, irrespective of the domain of the SDF (recall footnote 8). We leave these issues for the future. . I is the singleton set containing e, the intersection of the two budget frontiers. G is ae excluding the point e; H is eb excluding the point e.
' G is eb' excluding the point e.
' H is ea ' excluding the point e.
Proof of Proposition 5.1.
Let C satisfy tightness. Notice first that, given tightness of C, (4.3) is equivalent to: 
